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WHEN IS A VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE
FRAUDULENT IN NEW YORK?
"A conveyance

. . . of an estate or interest

made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
or other persons of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures,
debts or demands or a bond or other evidence of debt
given, suit commenced, or decree, or judgment suffered,
with the like intent, is void as against every person so
hindered, delayed, or defrauded."
Sec. 263, Real Property Law.
"The question of fraudulent intent in a case arising
under this article shall be deemed a question of fact, and
not of law, and a conveyance or charge shall not be adjudged fraudulent as against creditors, purchasers, or incumbrancers solely on the ground that it was not founded
on a valuable consideration."
Sec. 265, Real Property Law.
"There is no question that at the time these conveyances
were made the defendant Lancelot M. Berkley was indebted
to the plaintiff, and the rule of law as stated in Smith vs.
Reid, 134 N. Y. 569, is that a voluntary conveyance by one
indebted at the time the conveyance is made is presumptively
fraudulent as against existing creditors."
Per Cohalan, J., in Buhby vs. Berkley, 85 Misc.
178.
The apparent contradiction between the provisions of the
statute relating to fraudulent conveyances and the opinions and
decisions of the courts, as well as the increasing frequency of
litigation in which unsatisfied creditors seek to set aside dispositions of property by their debtors, seems to warrant an examination into the authorities on this subject. The provisions of the
Real Property Law quoted (there are similar enactments in the
statutes relating to personal property: Sections 35, 37, 38,
Personal Property Law) are only re-enactments of a law which
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has been upon the statute books from a very early period in our
judicial history (2 R. S., Chap. 7, Tit. 3, Secs. 1, 4).
The earliest important case in this state dealing with the question, and the case which ultimately led to the enactment of the
provisions of law referred to, is Reade vs. Livizgston (3 Johns.
Ch. Rep. 481), decided by Chancellor Kent in 1818. In that case
a creditor attacked a voluntary settlement made by a debtor upon
his wife, and the Chancellor laid down the rule that any voluntary
settlement or disposition of property by a man indebted at the
time was conclusively fraudulent and open to attack at the instance of an unsatisfied creditor. This conclusion, reached after
an extended examination of the English cases, he states as follows
at page 500 of his opinion:
"The conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that if
the party be indebted at the time of a voluntary settlement
it is presumed to be fraudulent in respect to such debts,
and no circumstance will permit those debts to be affected
b the settlement or repel the legal presumption of fraud.
The presumption of law in this case does not depend upon
the amount of the debts, or the extent of the property in
settlement, or the circumstances of the party."
This doctrine, that a man's debt casts a shade over all his
property, however extensive, preventing any voluntary disposition
of it, comes directly in conflict with the feeling inherent in most
of us and fostered by the common law, that one's property, provided it be more than sufficient to meet his obligations, is his own
to do with as he will. It is not surprising, therefore, that criticisms of the rule soon appeared in the cases,' nor that ultimately
the statutes relating to fraudulent conveyances were enacted to
limit its effect. The purpose of these statutes and their effect
was to make what formerly had been an absolute conclusion of
law, a question of fact, to be decided in each case, with the
proviso, however, that no conveyance should be adjudged fraudulent solely upon the ground that it was voluntary.2 The determining element in each case under the statute is the intent with which
the conveyance is made.3 This element, in addition to the provision that no conveyance should be adjudged fraudulent solely
because voluntary, it appears has given rise to most of the mis'Mohawk Bank vs. Atwater, 2 Paige 54, 58; Wickes vs. Clarke, 3 Edw.
Ch. 58, 61; Seward vs. Jackson, 8 Cow. 406, 422.
'Babcock vs. Eckler, 24 N. Y. 623.
'Citizens National Bank vs. Fonda, 18 Misc. 114.
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understanding of the statute by lawyers, and to the apparently
conflicting decisions of the courts. If a man's state of mind be
innocent of any fraud, the question naturally presents itself, can
any disposition of his property, however disastrous to creditors,
be declared fraudulent. The courts have met this difficulty by
holding that a man is deemed to intend the necessary consequences
of his acts, and that where the inevitable result of his conduct is
to prevent payment of his creditors, however innocent his motives, a fraudulent intent will be spelled out as a fact. 4 It has
been held further that the provisions of the statute that fraudulent
intent should be deemed a question of fact do not interfere with
the prerogative of the court to direct a verdict, provided the
fraudulent intent be conclusively established on the face of the
instrument of transfer, or by the uncontradicted verbal evidence. 5
The reason for this is that, in such a case, to direct a verdict, or
to set aside'a finding of a referee to the contrary, does not involve
implying a presumption or conclusion of law that the transaction
is fraudulent. It merely means that the proof in a particular case
presents no issue of fact for a .jury, and, irrespective of any legal
presumption, conclusively shows fraud in fact.
What circumstances then, conclusively warrant the court in
finding a fraudulent intent as a fact, and secondly what class of
claims, coming to the attention of a possible debtor, render any
subsequent transfer of his property without consideration open to
future attack? Taking up the second question first, the statute
has been liberally construed as its terms warrant, and its operation
is not limited merely to the benefit of creditors in the ordinary
sense of the term. It has been held that a contingent liability, as
endorser on a promissory note,6 a tort liability,7 and even a possible future liability consequent upon engaging in a hazardous
business, where property was transferred immediately before entering on the same, 8 are all such claims as come within the purvieu
of the statute. As to the first question, insolvency at the time of
conveyance, 9 a conveyance of all one's property when indebted or
subject to contingent liability1" or a conveyance of so much of it
as to leave an insufficient amount to pay creditors' claims11 have
"Cole vs. Tyler, 65 N. Y. 73; Coleman vs. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17.
'Bulger vs. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459.
'Citizens National Bank vs. Fonda, supra.
'Martin vs. Walker, 12 Hun, 46.
'Young vs. Hermans, 66 N. Y. 374.
'Erickson vs. Quinn, 47 N. Y. 410.
"'Tanner vs. Eckhardt, 107 App. Div. 79.
'Cole vs. Tyler, subra.
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all been held to conclude the courts in finding a fraudulent intent
in. fact. It may well be questioned whether in so holding the
courts have not overridden the statute's literal requirements that
the fraudulent intent is always a question of fact on all the circumstances. However, whether justifiably or not, it is settled
that in determining the fraudulent intent the courts will deem acts
of more import than words. 12 Hence if a party does an act which
must defraud another, his declaration that he did not intend to
defraud, according to the decisions, is weighed down by the evidence of his own act. There can be no quarrel, however, with
the expediency of the rule which holds that a man's intent will
be deemed fraudulent if, while indebted or subject to the claims
of others for damages, he disposes of all his property.
It is quite another thing, on the other hand, for a court to hold,
as in Bushby vs. Berkley, supra, that a voluntary conveyance by
one indebted is presumptively fraudulent. This would seem even
to disregard the plain terms of the statute which make the question of fraudulent intent a question of fact. However, a right
understanding of the cases and of the purpose intended to be
effected by the statute will, we believe, resolve the question. The
statute was passed to overcome the effect of the decision in Reade
vs. Livingston, .supra. That case made fraudulent intent a matter of law whenever a voluntary conveyance while indebted was
shown. In cases criticizing it, it was suggested that in such a
case the conclusion of fraud was not absolute, but prima facie
only, in other words, a presumption in the strict sense of the term.
The statute, it is submitted, was enacted merely to give effect to
'"The statute provides that the question of fraudulent intent in cases
of this character 'shall be deemed a question of fact and not of law', and the
claim is made that here there is no finding by the referee of fraudulent intent;
but that on the contrary he has found the whole transaction to be fair and
honest. He has, however, found facts from which the inference of fraud
is inevitable, and although he has characterized the transactions as honest
and fair, that does not make them innocent nor change their essential character in the eye of the law. Mr. Burr must be deemed to have intended the
natural and inevitable consequence of his acts, and that was to hinder, delay
and defraud his creditors", per Earl, J., in Coleman vs. Burr, supra.
"It is also claimed that there was no intent on Crawford's part to defraud
his creditors and that the findings of the judge upon this subject were not
sustained by the evidence. It was not necessary that there should be any
actual fraudulent intent. * * * This presumption (of fraud), however,
is not to be overthrown by mere evidence of good intent or generous impulses or feelings. It must be overcome by circumstances showing on their
face that there could have been no bad intent, such as that the gift was a
reasonable provision and that the debtor still retained sufficient means to
pay his debts", per Dwight, C., in Cole vs. Tyler, supra.
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the doctrine of the cases in support of this latter rule." This
being its purpose as construed by the courts, though its terms
admittedly are much broader, its effect is merely to remove the
conclusive rule of law which formerly existed. There are two
leading cases that seem to confirm this. (Kain vs. Larkin, 131
N. Y. 300, and Smith vs. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568.) In Kain vs.
Larkin, which was an action by a judgment creditor (the judgment resulting from a tort liability) to set aside a conveyance by
the debtor, the Court of Appeals, which at that time consisted of
two divisions, held that under the statute a voluntary conveyance,
even by one indebted at the time, was perfectly proper, unless
other circumstances were shown which would justify a finding of
fraudulent intent in fact. Chief Judge Earl, writing the opinion,
said at page 307:
"An owner of real estate can make a voluntary settlement thereof upon his wife and children without any consideration, provided he has ample property left to satisfy
all just claims of his creditors . . . and when a judgment creditor assails a conveyance made by the judgment
debtor, he cannot cast upon the grantee the onus of showing good faith and of establishing that the grantor was
solvent after the conveyance by simply showing that the
deed was not founded upon a valuable consideration, but
the person assailing the deed assumes the burden of showing that it was executed in bad faith and that it left the
grantor insolvent and without ample property to pay his
existing debts and liabilities."
In Smith vs. Reid, which reached the other division of the Court
of Appeals shortly afterward, the court came to an apparently
opposite conclusion. In that case, per Brown, J., the court said:
"The rule is well settled that a voluntary conveyance
by one indebted at the time is presumptively fraudulent."
Both of these decisions were considered by the Court of Appeals
recently in the case of Kerker vs. Levy," and finding an apparent
""In Jackson vs. Seward, 8 Cow. 406, it was held by the Court of Errors

that a conveyance or settlement in consideration of blood and natural
affection, though by one indebted at the time, was prima facie only and not
conclusively fraudulent.

Subsequently by Section 4 of Title 3, Chapter 7,

Part 2 of the Revised Statutes (2 R. S. 137) it was declared that the

question of fraudulent intent in all cases arising under the provisions of
that chapter should be deemed a question of fact. * * * The statute

substantially declares and was intended to declare the doctrine held in
Jackson vs. Seward." Per Sutherland, J., in Babcock vs. Eckler, supra, at
p. 633.
206 N. Y. 109.
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contradiction in them the court, in a short per curiam opinion, held
that the rule laid down in Smitl vs. Reid was to be preferred to
that of Kain vs. Larkin. It is submitted, however, that rightly
understood there is no necessary conflict between the decisions,
and that in reality both state correct propositions of law. The
solution is found in the old distinction between the strict burden
of proof, and the burden of going forward with the proof or the
burden of evidence. 15 It seems that the true rule is, and always
has been, that, under the statute as interpreted by the decisions, there is nothing wrong or to be condemned in a voluntary
conveyance by one indebted whose property remains ample to meet
his obligations. A judgment creditor attacidng such a disposition
would have to show on the whole case the fraudulent intent
required by the law. In other words, such circumstances surrounding the conveyance as insolvency, or a grant of so much of
the debtor's property as to leave him fairly unable to meet his
obligations, would have to appear to warrant the court in finding
the presence of this intent. 1 This is very different, however, from
what the course of events would be on the trial of the issues involved. It seems that, on such a trial, upon proof of the two
facts of existing indebtedness and voluntary conveyance of the
debtor's property, prima facie a presumption of fraudulent intent
arises. Hence a judgment creditor attacking such a conveyance,
upon proof of these two facts, could rest his direct case, because,
until some explanation were offered, the law would then imply
some ulterior motive as the reason for the conveyance, which at
this stage would require a finding of fraudulent intent. The
burden of evidence, or the burden of going forward, would then
shift to the defendant to show, in any way proper to the case, that
no fraudulent intent within the meaning of the law existed in
fact. Then the burden of evidence to rebut such proof would
revert back to the plaintiff. On the whole case, however, the
plaintiff could only succeed, since the true burden of proof or the
burden of establishing never leaves him, by showing by evidence
clearly preponderating in his favor the existence of facts and cir"'"But, passing this point with this mere observation, the contestants
assert that the burden of proof is always on the proponents. They seem to
have confounded the 'burden of proof' with the 'burden of evidence'. The
distinction between the rules relating to either of these burdens is clearly
laid down by late writers of authority on the law of evidence. In this
proceeding when the proponents had rested, the burden of taking up the
proof or in other words the 'burden of evidence' was on the contestants,"
per Fowler, Surrogate, in Matter of Sperb, 71 Misc. 378.
'Babcock vs. -Eckler, supra.

FORDHAm LAW REVIEW

cunstances from which, as a fact, under the authorities, the conclusion of fraudulent intent must follow. That this is the true
line of distinction in the cases is evident from the statement of
Brown, J., in Smith vs. Reid, supra:
"There was no evidence introduced by the defendant
upon the question, and we are of the opinion that the facts
stated" (a voluntary conveyance -while indebted) "raised
a presumption that the deeds were executed by Taylor with
intent to defraud his creditors, and in the absence of any
explanation thereof it was the duty of the court to have
determined the fact of the grantee's indebtedness in accordance with such presumption."
Clearly, then, the rule of Smith vs. Reid applies only to the prima
facie case. In Kain vs. Larkin, supra, there was proof by the
defendant that the conveyance was not voluntary because made
in consideration of services rendered and moneys expended by a
daughter of the grantor. The conclusion of the trial court was
that the services would not constitute a sufficient consideration.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not clear whether the trial
court deemed such a contract invalid as a matter of law, or
whether it meant to hold merely that, in this instance, the services
were disproportionate in value to that of the property transferred.
Hence it sent the case back for a new trial. It is clear, however,
that the court's expressions in dealing with the plaintiff's burden
referred to his burden on the whole issue involved, because that
was the matter before the court, and not merely to the establishment of a prima facie case. It seems, therefore, that the true rule
in this state is that a voluntary conveyance by one indebted is not
necessarily improper and subject to avoidance by creditors, if
explained by circumstances leading to a finding in fact of no
fraudulent intent. What these circumstances usually are are discussed supra in this article. Prima facie, however, such a conveyance unexplained will be presumed fraudulent as a fact.
Hence, in the absence of an assumption of the burden of going
forward with the evidence on the part of the defendant, it will
necessitate a finding of fraudulent intent in fact and a decision
setting aside the conveyance which is the subject of attack.17
Although under this rule it seems that the courts have probably carried out the purpose of the legislature in enacting the
statute, which, as stated above, was merely to do away with the
"Wilks vs. Greacen, 155 App. Div. 623; Sanitary Fire Proofing and

Contracting Company vs. Scheidecker, 165 App. Div. 294.
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effect of the decision in Reade vs. Lizingston, it seems equally
true that in so doing they have disregarded the plain language of
the law, which is certainly broad enough to make the question of
fraudulent intent a question of fact in every case and never the
subject of a legal presumption.
IGNATIUS M. WILKINSON.
FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL.

